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FATHER KNOWS BEST: THE UNWED FATHER'S RIGHT




Before 1972, if an unwed mother placed her child for adoption, the
putative father' could not prevent the legal system in most states from
extinguishing his parental rights.2 Because most states required only the
consent of the unwed mother for adoption,3 they could permanently ter-
minate the unwed father's relationship with his child against his will.
Adoption irrevocably rescinds an unwed father's parental rights:4 he is
denied visitation rights, and, because adoption records are kept confiden-
tial,' he has no way of contacting his offspring. Once adopted, the child
is forever lost to the unwed father.
In 1972, the Supreme Court stated for the first time that under certain
circumstances, the due process requirements of the Constitution protect
the parental rights of an unwed father. In Stanley v. Illinois,6 the Court
held that the custodial rights of a putative father who participated in the
"companionship, care, custody, and management" of his child could not
be revoked without a hearing to determine his parental fitness.7
Since Stanley, the Court has expanded and clarified the unwed father's
rights.8 According to the Court, a natural father's right to veto the adop-
tion of his child does not derive from a biological link alone: it must be
1. "Putative father" refers to "[t]he alleged or reputed father of a child born out of
wedlock." Black's Law Dictionary 1237 (6th ed. 1990). "Unwed father," "biological
father," and "natural father" will also be used interchangeably throughout this Note to
indicate the father of a child born out of wedlock.
2. See H. Krause, Illegitimacy: Law And Social Policy 32 (1971).
3. Courts adhered to the maternal-preference doctrine because they felt that the
"care, love and discipline" of mothers were of supreme importance to children. Ullman
v. Ullman, 151 A.D. 419, 424-25, 135 N.Y.S. 1080, 1083 (1912). Many state legislatures
codified the maternal-preference doctrine. See, e.g., Okla. Stat. Ann. title. 30, § 11 (Vest
1955) (repealed 1983); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 30-27-19(2) (1984); Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-3-10 (1989). See also R. Horowitz & H. Davidson, Legal Rights Of Children 234
(1984) (maternal preference statutes had been adopted by more than a dozen states by the
turn of the century).
4. See H. Clark, Jr., The Law Of Domestic Relations In The United States 602
(1968).
5. See H. Clark, Jr., The Law Of Domestic Relations In The United States 694 (2d
ed. 1987). Examples of statutes sealing adoption records are N.J. Stat. Ann. 9:3-52(a)
(West 1991); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 114 (McKinney Supp. 1992); Va. Code Ann. § 20-
63.1-236 (1990 & Supp. 1991).
6. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
7. Id. at 651-53.
8. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, (1989); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S.
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accompanied by an existing parental relationship with his child.9 If an
unwed father has developed such a relationship, he deserves constitu-
tional protection of his interest in maintaining a continuing role in his
child's upbringing.1"
Twenty years after Stanley, an unwed father's parental rights remain
unclear. In particular, when an unwed mother surrenders her child for
adoption at birth or shortly thereafter, the natural father never receives
an opportunity to develop a relationship with his child and thus is unable
to satisfy the Court's "biology plus" requirements." According to one
commentator, "the question that is most important to the functioning of
the typical adoption process has not been answered: [none] of the earlier
cases articulates the interested and responsible unmarried father's rights
immediately after the child's birth." 2
Recently, the New York Court of Appeals confronted this issue in In
re Raquel Marie X.13 The court held that an unwed father who is willing
to assume custody of his infant and who promptly manifests parental
responsibility can veto the proposed adoption of his child. 4 By striking
down a statutory requirement that a putative father live with the mother
for a portion, if not all, of the six months prior to adoption to earn the
right to veto that adoption,1 5 Raquel Marie enlarged the unwed father's
rights by giving him a greater opportunity to demonstrate his parental
commitment and receive custody of his child.1 6
Although Raquel Marie seems to provide relief to an unwed father, it
ignores the realities of adoption procedures. Custody of an infant is usu-
ally granted to adoptive parents on a temporary basis pending the out-
come of a custody proceeding.' 7 Yet, Raquel Marie never discusses how
courts can reconcile the rights of an unwed father who has been adjudi-
248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S.
246 (1978). For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 34-84 and accompanying text.
9. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 257, 261-62; Michael H., 491 U.S. at 142-43 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
10. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261.
11. 88.8% of all children adopted in 1982 were less than one year old. See National
Comm. For Adoption, Adoption Factbook: United States Data, Issues, Regulations And
Resources 63 (1985).
Unfortunately, the National Center for Social Statistics of the U.S. Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare last published its annual report on adoption statistics in
1975. In an effort to demonstrate the feasibility of collecting adoption statistics and to
encourage the reinstatement of an ongoing national adoption data system, the National
Committee For Adoption collected and published national adoption statistics for 1982.
This is the most recent year for which statistical adoption data are available.
12. H. Krause, Family Law In A Nutshell 174 (2d ed. 1986).
13. 76 N.Y.2d 387, 559 N.E.2d 418, 559 N.Y.S.2d 855 (1990), cert. denied, - U.S.
-, Ill S. Ct. 517 (1990).
14. See id. at 402-03, 559 N.E.2d at 424-25, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 861-62.
15. See N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 1 ll(l)(e) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1992).
16. See Family Law--Unwed Fathers' Rights-New York Court of Appeals Mandates
Veto Power Over Newborn's Adoption For Unwed Father Who Demonstrates Parental Re-
sponsibility-In re Raquel Marie X., 104 Harv. L. Rev. 800, 800 (1991).
17. Telephone interviews with adoption clerks of Surrogate Court in Kings County,
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cated as responsible and deserving of parental rights with the best inter-
ests of his infant child who has lived with and become emotionally
attached to adoptive parents and who could be psychologically trauma-
tized by a custody change."8 Courts are left with the predicament of
either granting custody to a deserving putative father and risking emo-
tional harm to his child, or approving the adoption to protect the child's
well-being and depriving a putative father of his parental rights. 9
This Note examines the effects of awarding adoptive parents pendente
lite2' custody of an infant placed for adoption at birth. Part I first out-
lines the unwed father's constitutional rights and then discusses his rights
after Raquel Marie. Part II analyzes the consequences of granting
pendente lite custody to adoptive parents and demonstrates that the legal
system has failed to harmonize the parental rights of a responsible unwed
father with the best interests of his infant nurtured by adoptive parents.
Part III argues that granting pendente lite custody to a willing putative
Manhattan County, and Nassau County, New York (Nov. 7, 1991). See infra notes 140-
41 and accompanying text.
18. The repercussions of Raquel Marie are critical to the adoption process. Most
adoptions involve infants or young children. See supra note 11. Moreover, the number of
out-of-wedlock births has increased rapidly over the past few decades. Between 1950 and
1986, the percentage of illegitimate births grew from 4% to 23.4%. See U.S. Bureau Of
The Census 66 (1985) (109th ed. 1989). See also D. Bogue, The Population Of The
United States-Historical Trends And Future Projections 276 (1985) (recently, there has
been "an unprecedented propensity to bear children out of wedlock"); A Baby Boom on
TVAs Biological Clocks Cruelly Tick Away, N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1991, at C15, col. 5
(unwed motherhood is increasingly common and accepted); The Fissioning of the Nuclear
Family, N.Y. Times, June 9, 1991, § 4, at 7, col. 1 (unwed motherhood is escalating);
American Noter Population: Hold the Wedding Bells, Time, Dec. 16, 1991, at 39 (out-of-
wedlock births are increasing). This increase has helped advance the perception of illegit-
imacy as socially acceptable which, in turn, has reduced the social, religious, and eco-
nomic stigma once attached to illegitimacy. See generally Kisthardt, Of Fatherhood,
Families and Fantasy: The Legacy of Michael H. v. Gerald D., 65 Tul. L Rev. 585, 593
(1991) (the stigma associated with illegitimacy has diminished); Many Teens Want Ba-
bies, Newsday, Nov. 1, 1991, at 132, col. 3 (there is no longer any stigma to having a
child out of wedlock). As a result, unmarried women are more inclined to have children,
and the trend of having children out of wedlock seems likely to continue.
19. See infra notes 151-89 and accompanying text. Compare In re Baby Girl M., 191
Cal. App. 3d 786 (opinion omitted), 236 Cal. Rptr. 660, 665 (1987) (if there is risk of
harm to child from custody shift to natural father, child should remain with adoptive
parents), cert. dismissed sub. nom. McNamara v. County of San Diego Dep't of Social
Servs., 488 U.S. 152 (1988) and Michael U. v. Jamie B., 39 Cal. 3d 787, 793, 705 P.2d
362, 366, 218 Cal. Rptr. 39, 42 (1985) (awarding custody to unwed father after child has
bonded with adoptive parents would disrupt emotional welfare of child) and In re Reyna,
55 Cal. App. 3d 288, 298, 126 Cal. Rptr. 138, 148-49 (1976) (custody must remain with
adoptive parents if transferring child to natural father's care is not in the child's best
interests) with In re Baby Girl Eason, 257 Ga. 292, 297, 358 S.E.2d 459, 463 (1987) (if
natural father has not abandoned his child, he must receive custody over adoptive par-
ents) and Lathrop v. Scott, 2 Kan. App. 2d 90, 95, 575 P.2d 894, 898 (1978) (unwed
father's right to custody of his child must prevail over those of adoptive parents) and
John E. v. John Doe, 164 A.D.2d, 375, 378, 564 N.Y.S.2d 439, 441 (1990) (custody shift
from adoptive parents to unwed father would disturb child's psychological stability).
20. The term "pendente lite" means "[pl]ending the lawsuit; during the actual pro-
gress of a suit; during litigation." Black's Law Dictionary 1134 (6th ed. 1990).
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father whose infant was placed for adoption at birth will give meaning to
his constitutional right to raise his child; Part III also argues that expe-
diting the legal system's determination of the putative father's parental
rights will protect the emotional welfare of his infant. Finally, this Note
concludes that unless states grant an unwed father custody of his infant
while his parental rights are being adjudicated, the unwed father's rights
will not be adequately protected.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Unwed Father's Constitutional Rights
The Supreme Court has decided five cases which have defined and ex-
panded the unwed father's constitutional rights with respect to his
child.21 None of these decisions, however, discusses the unwed father's
constitutional rights regarding an infant placed for adoption at birth.
1. Stanley v. Illinois: Establishing the Unwed Father's
Due Process Rights
The Supreme Court first addressed the putative father's equal protec-
tion and due process rights in Stanley v. Illinois.22 Joan and Peter Stan-
ley lived together periodically for eighteen years without marrying.
During that time, they had three children.23 Under Illinois law, an un-
wed father's children became wards of the state upon the mother's
death.24 When Joan Stanley died, the State of Illinois declared Peter
Stanley's children wards of the state and placed them with court-ap-
pointed guardians.25 Stanley argued that the State of Illinois violated his
fourteenth amendment rights of due process and equal protection be-
cause, unlike unwed fathers such as himself, married fathers and unwed
mothers could lose their parental rights only upon a finding of
unfitness.26
The Court held that "as a matter of due process of law, Stanley was
entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children were
taken from him."27 The Court recognized the legitimate interest of the
21. Under the doctrine of parens patriae, the government has significant latitude in
restricting the rights of parents in order to protect the welfare of children. See J. White-
head, Parents' Rights 108-11 (1985).
The five Supreme Court cases that have addressed the rights of unwed fathers are
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983);
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); and
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
22. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
23. See id. at 646.
24. See id.
25. See id. Stanley claimed that he had "loved, cared for, and supported [his] chil-
dren from the time of their births until the death of their mother," id. at 666 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting), and had never been found to be an unfit parent. See id. at 646.
26. See id.
27. Id. at 649.
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state in protecting "'the moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare
of the minor and the best interests of the community.' "2" It rejected,
however, the state's presumption that all putative fathers were unfit par-
ents.29 Under Illinois law, children could be removed from the custody
of married parents only after notice, a hearing, and proof of unfitness.3 °
In contrast, no hearing was necessary for unwed fathers because the state
presumed that unwed fathers were unfit simply because they did not
marry the mothers.3'
The Court further held that denying a fitness hearing to an unwed
father while granting one to all other classes of parents violated the equal
protection clause. 32 The Court concluded that all parents were entitled
to a fitness hearing before the state could deprive them of custody of their
children.33
2. Quilloin v. Walcott and Caban v. Mohammed:
The "Biology Plus" Test
While Stanley determined that an unwed father had some parental
rights, it left the boundaries of his rights undefined. Six years later, in
Quilloin v. Walkott,34 a case originating in Georgia state court, the Court
further clarified these boundaries. Leon Quilloin fathered a child but
neither married the mother, Ardel Walcott, nor lived with the mother or
child.35 When the child was three years old, Walcott married another
man.36 After Walcott and her husband lived together with the child for
seven years, Walcott gave permission to her husband to adopt the child.3"
During this period, Quilloin had provided only sporadic financial sup-
28. Id. at 652 (quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 37, para. 701-2).
29. See id. at 654. According to the Court, if Stanley had demonstrated his fitness,
the state's interest could have been satisfied by allowing Stanley to keep custody of his
children. See id. at 657-58.
30. See id. at 650.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 658.
33. See id. at 649. For a more detailed discussion of Stanley, see Hession, Adoptions
After "Stanley'--Rights for Fathers of Illegitimate Children, 61 Ill. B.J. 350 (1973); Note,
Constitutional Law-Stanley v. Illinois: New Rights for Putative Fathers, 21 De Paul L
Rev. 1036 (1972); Comment, Protecting the Putative Father's Rights After Stanley v. Illi-
nois: Problems in Implementation, 13 J. Fain. L. 115 (1973-74); Comment, The Emerg-
ing Constitutional Protection of the Putative Father's Parental Rights, 70 Mich. L Rev.
1581 (1972); Note, The Impact of Stanley v. Illinois on Custody Proceedings for Illegiti-
mate Children: Procedural Parity for the Putative Father?, 3 N.Y.U. Rev. L & Soc.
Change 31 (1973); Comment, Constitutional Law--Right of Unwed Father to a Fitness
Hearing Prior to State Imposition of Wardship Over His Illegitimate Children-Stanley n.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), 7 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 159 (1972); Note, Stanley v. Illinois:
Constitutional Rights of a Putative Father, 41 UMKC L. Rev. 334 (1972); Note, The
"Strange Boundaries" of Stanley: Providing Notice of Adoption to the Unknown Putative
Father, 59 Va. L. Rev. 517 (1973).
34. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).





port for the child and had made infrequent visits. 38
Although Quilloin neither sought custody nor objected to the child
remaining with Walcott and her husband, he tried to prevent the adop-
tion in order to receive visitation rights. 9 Quilloin claimed that, as a
matter of due process and equal protection, an unwed father was entitled
to an absolute right to veto the adoption of his child absent a finding of
unfitness, just as a married or divorced father was so entitled under the
law.' Pursuant to the 1975 Georgia statute in effect in Quilloin, an un-
wed mother's consent was sufficient to place the child for adoption, while
an unwed father was required to legitimate the child before receiving
veto power over the adoption.41
In allowing the adoption to proceed in Quilloin, the Court focused on
the relationship that Quilloin had developed with his child. 42 The Court
held that Quilloin was not entitled to veto the adoption because he had
not supported or nurtured the child, nor had he "shouldered any signifi-
cant responsibility with respect to the daily supervision, education, pro-
tection, or care of the child."43 Quilloin thus established that an unwed
father must have more than a biological link with his child to receive
constitutional protection of his parental rights-he must participate in
the care of his child and accept responsibility for his child's well-being.
If an unwed father is unable to display such commitment, the Court
would allow the state to terminate his parental rights."
The Court next considered a putative father's rights in Caban v. Mo-
hammed.45 Abdiel Caban and Maria Mohammed lived together in New
York for five years and had two children. 46 Although the couple never
married, Caban was listed as the father on both birth certificates. Caban
supported the children, and he lived with them until he separated from
Mohammed.47 He continued to see the children regularly until they
were sent to live with their maternal grandmother in Puerto Rico. With
the grandmother's permission, Caban brought the children back to New
38. See id. at 250-51.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 248-50.
41. See Ga. Code Ann. §§ 74-103(3), 74-203 (1976), amended by Ga. Code Ann § 19-
8-12 (1991).
42. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978).
43. Id.
44. See id. For a more detailed discussion of Quilloin, see Levy, The Rights of Par-
ents, 1976 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 693; Note, Unwed Fathers-Adoption-Foster Care Agency
Seeking Permission to Consent to Child's Adoption Need Not Always Grant Child's Unwed
Father Notice and Opportunity to Be Heard, 5 Fordham Urb. L.J. 175 (1976); Comment,
Illegitimacy and the Rights of Unwed Fathers in Adoption Proceedings After Quilloin v.
Walcott, 12 J. Marshall Prac. & Proc. 383 (1979); Note, Family Law- Voluntary Legiti-
mation-Father Has No Absolute Right to Legitimate Child Solely on Proof of Biological
Fatherhood, 8 St. Mary's L.J. 392 (1976); Comment, Parental Rights: The Putative Fa-
ther, 18 Washburn L.J. 174 (1978).
45. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
46. See id. at 382.
47. See id.
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York to visit, with the understanding that the children would be returned
after a few days. 8
After Mohammed instituted custody proceedings, she obtained tempo-
rary custody and Caban received visitation rights. Together with her new
husband, Mohammed then filed a petition to adopt the children. Caban
and his new wife filed a cross petition for adoption.49
Under New York law in 1979, an unwed mother's consent alone was
required for the adoption of her child.50 By withholding her consent to
the adoption by Caban and his wife, Mohammed was able to veto his
petition. On the other hand, because New York law did not require the
unwed father's consent for the adoption of his child, Caban was given
only an opportunity to argue that the best interests of his children would
be furthered by granting his adoption petition. The lower court granted
Mohammed's petition, and the appeals court affirmed.5"
The Supreme Court held that the New York statute violated the equal
protection clause by treating unwed parents differently solely on the basis
of gender without furthering an important state interest.5 2 According to
the Court, "[g]ender-based distinctions 'must serve important govern-
mental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives' in order to withstand judicial scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause."53 In this case, the New York statute's distinction
between Caban and Mohammed did not further the state's important in-
terest because, the Court concluded, Caban had "a relationship ... fully
comparable to that of the mother." 4
48. See id. at 383.
49. See id.
50. The statute at issue was N.Y Doam. Rel. Law § 11 I(1)(C) (McKinney 1977). See
id. at 385.
51. Kazim M. v. Abdiel C., 43 N.Y.2d 708, 372 N.E.2d 42, 401 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1977),
rev'd sub nom. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
52. Caban, 441 U.S. at 382.
53. Id. at 388 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)). As it had in Stan-
ley and Quilloin, the Court in Caban grounded the unwed father's rights in an existing
and substantial relationship with his children. See id. at 392-93. Moreover, it is impor-
tant to note Justice Stevens' dissent, wherein he cautioned that Caban applies only to
cases where a child has had an opportunity to develop a relationship with his biological
father. See id. at 416 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Thus, Caban might not apply to the un-
wed father of an infant because he does not yet have a meaningful relationship with his
child. See id. at 389.
54. Id. at 389. For a more detailed discussion of Caban, see Young, Supreme Court
Report: Father of Illegitimate Wins in New York Case, 65 A.B.A. J. 954 (1979); Com-
ment, Caban v. Mohammed: Extending the Rights of Unwed Fathers, 46 Brooklyn L.
Rev. 95 (1979); Note, Constitutional Law--Equal Protection-Parent and Child-Adop-
tion-Unwed Father has Equal Protection Right to Consent--Caban v. Mohammed, 1979
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 987; Note, Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-Gender-Based Classifi-
cations in Adoptions Found Violative. Caban v. Mohammed, 63 Marq. L. Rev. 131
(1979); Comment, An Analysis of the Unwed Father's Adoption Rights in Light of Caban
v. Mohammed: A Foundation in Federal Law for a Necessary Redrafting of the Penn-
sylvania Adoption Act, 25 Vill. L. Rev. 317 (1979-1980).
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3. Lehr v. Robertson: The Unwed Father's Right to Notice
Lehr v. Robertson"5 addressed the question of what notice an unwed
father is entitled to prior to an adoption proceeding. Jonathan Lehr and
Lorraine Robertson lived together in New York prior to their child's
birth. Lehr did not live with the mother and child after birth, he did not
provide any financial support for the child, and his name did not appear
on the child's birth certificate.5 6 Lehr claimed, however, that Robertson
resisted his efforts to provide for the child and hid herself and the baby
from him. 7
Eight months after the child's birth, Lorraine married Richard Rob-
ertson. When the child was two years old, the Robertsons filed a petition
to have the step father adopt the child. Lehr, however, received no no-
tice of the adoption petition: Lehr did not qualify as a putative father
entitled to notice under the New York statute because he had not filed
the required statement asserting his claim to be the father with the puta-
tive father registry. 8 Lehr contended that the state's failure to notify
him of his child's pending adoption violated his right to due process.5 9
In denying Lehr's petition, the Court stated that "[p]arental rights do
not spring full-blown from the biological connection between parent and
child. They require relationships more enduring."'  The Court further
noted that due process protection only arises once a relationship has de-
veloped between father and child.6" According to the Court, due process
did not require a more elaborate system of notification for an unwed fa-
ther who had never established a parental relationship with his child.62
The Court distinguished the parental relationships established in Stan-
ley and Caban from those established in Quilloin and Lehr.61 The puta-
tive fathers in Stanley and Caban had biological connections and
emotional bonds with their children; the putative fathers in Quilloin and
Lehr had only biological connections.' According to the Court:
The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the nat-
ural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a
relationship with his offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and ac-
cepts some measure of responsibility for the child's future, he may en-
joy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely
55. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
56. See id. at 252.
57. See id. at 269 (White, J., dissenting).
58. See id. at 250-51. The statute at issue was N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 1ll(2)(a)
(McKinney 1977) (amended 1980). See id. at 251, n.5.
59. See id. at 250.
60. Id. at 260 (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1980) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting)).
61. See id. (citing Caban, 441 U.S. at 414 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
62. See id. at 261-62.
63. See id. at 261.
64. See id.
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valuable contributions to the child's development. 65
Lehr clearly indicated that an unwed father is to receive constitutional
protection of his parental rights only where he has participated in the
custody and care of his child.66
4. Michael H. v. Gerald D.: The Marital Presumption
The Court's most recent decision regarding the unwed father's rights is
Michael H. v. Gerald D. 67 The issue before the Court was the constitu-
tionality of a California statute which provided that the child of a woman
living with her husband be conclusively presumed to be the child of the
marriage, absent a showing that the husband is either impotent or
sterile.68
While married to Gerald D., Carol D. engaged in an extra-marital af-
fair with Michael H.69 Carol became pregnant shortly thereafter and
gave birth to Victoria D.70 Although Gerald was listed as the father on
Victoria's birth certificate, Carol told Michael that he was the father.7
A blood test established this with a 98.07% certainty.' After living al-
ternately with Michael, Gerald and another man, Carol decided to stay
with Gerald and refused to allow Michael to continue seeing Victoria."1
Michael commenced an action to establish his paternity and to secure
visitation rights.7 4 Gerald moved for summary judgment on the ground
that, due to the marital presumption, there was no triable issue of fact.'"
The California state court granted Gerald's motion and concluded that,
under the circumstances of this case, the presumption was not
rebuttable.
7 6
65. Id. at 262 (footnote omitted). This "opportunity" has subsequently been referred
to as the putative father's "opportunity interest." Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of
Unwed Fathers Before and After Lehr v. Robertson, 45 Ohio St. L. J. 313, 351 (1984).
66. See id. at 262. For a more detailed discussion of Lehr, see Buchanan, supra note
65; Dembitz, Lehr Decision Helps Out-of-Wedlock Newborns Find Homes, 70 A.B.A. J.
124 (1984); Note, The Grudging and Crabbed Approach to Due Process for the Unwed
Father. Lehr v. Robertson, 16 Conn. L. Rev. 571 (1984); Comment, Lehr v. Robertson:
Unwed Fathers and Adoption-How Much Process is Due?, 7 Harv. Women's LJ. 265
(1984); Note, Putative Father's Right to Notice of Adoption Proceedings Invlving His
Child, 49 Mo. L. Rev. 650 (1984); Note, Lehr v. Robertson: A Constricted View of the
Rights of Putative Fathers, 4 Pace L. Rev. 477 (1984); Note, Lehr v. Robertson: Putting
the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Supreme Court Limits the Scope of the Putative Father's
Right to Notice, Hearing, and Consent in the Adoption of His Illegitimate Child, 15 U. Tol.
L. Rev. 1501 (1984).
67. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
68. See id. at 115. The statute at issue was Cal. Evid. Code § 621(a), (c)-(d) (West
Supp. 1989) (amended 1990). See id.
69. See id. at 113.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 113-14.
72. See id. at 114.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 115.
76. See id. Under California law, the marital presumption may be rebutted by blood
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In upholding the constitutionality of the California statute, the
Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, stated that the marital presump-
tion is a justifiable way for the state "to promot[e] the 'peace and tran-
quility of States and families.' "I' According to the plurality, in order for
the Constitution to protect a putative father's right to maintain a rela-
tionship with his child, the right must be one that was "traditionally pro-
tected by our society." 8  Our society, the plurality noted, has
traditionally protected the marital relationship, while it has not tradition-
ally protected the "power of the natural father to assert parental rights
over a child born into a woman's existing marriage with another man." 9
Importantly, the plurality conceded that they might reach a different re-
sult where the marital parents do not wish to embrace the child as their
own.
80
The plurality decision in Michael H. seems to contradict previous
holdings by the Court which established that the unwed father's constitu-
tional rights attach when a biological link and a relationship exist be-
tween father and child-neither of which was contested in this case. In
fact, four dissenters found that Michael's rights deserved constitutional
protection because he had demonstrated parental responsibility and had
satisfied the Court's "biology plus" test.81
According to Justice Brennan's dissent, "[a]lthough an unwed father's
biological link to his child does not, in and of itself, guarantee him a
constitutional stake in his relationship with that child, such a link com-
bined with a substantial parent-child relationship will do so."82
In short, over the past two decades, the Supreme Court has greatly
expanded and clarified the unwed father's rights. A putative father re-
ceives constitutional protection only if he has seized his opportunity in-
terest and participated in the care and custody of his child. According to
Lehr v. Robertson,8 3 parental rights do not emerge solely from a biologi-
cal connection between parent and child; they "are a counterpart of the
responsibilities they have assumed. ' '84
tests; however, a motion for blood tests may only be made by the husband, or, if the
biological father has filed a paternity affidavit, by the wife. See id.
77. Id. at 125 (quoting J. Schouler, Law of the Domestic Relations § 225, at 304
(quoting Boullenois, Trait6 des Status, bk. 1, p. 62)).
78. Id. at 122.
79. Id. at 125.
80. See id. at 129 n.7.
81. See id. at 142-43 (Brennan, J., dissenting), 159-60 (White, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 142-43 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a more detailed discussion of Michael
H., see Kisthardt, Of Fatherhood, Families and Fantasy: The Legacy of Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 65 Tul. L. Rev. 585 (1991); West, The Ideal of Liberty: A Comment on
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1373 (1991); Note, Family Law Symposium:
Michael H. v. Gerald D.: Upholding the Marital Presumption Against a Dual Paternity
Claim, 50 La. L. Rev. 1015 (1991).
83. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
84. Id. at 260 (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979)).
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B. Unresolved Issues Concerning the Unwed Father's Rights
When an infant is placed for adoption at birth, the natural unwed fa-
ther can have no more than a biological link to his child. The Supreme
Court has yet to rule on what this unwed father must do to protect his
parental rights, effectively leaving the states free to find their own an-
swers. This, however, has proven to be a formidable task as a recent
New York Court of Appeals decision indicates."5
The court held in In re Raquel Marie86 that New York Domestic Re-
lations Law § 11 l(l)(e) is unconstitutional.8 7 Section 11 1(1)(e) governed
the rights of an unwed father to his infant placed for adoption before the
age of six months. The statute required a putative father to satisfy three
criteria before according him veto rights over an adoption: he had to
(1) live with the child or mother continuously for the six continuous
months immediately preceding the adoption; (2) publicly admit pater-
nity; and (3) provide reasonable financial support for the pregnancy and
birth. 8 Because the statute applied to an infant under six months of age,
the six-month cohabitation period necessarily exceeded the child's age
and could only be fulfilled if the putative father lived with the mother for
a portion, if not all, of the time. 9 According to the court, the "living
together requirement" places an inappropriate "focus on the relationship
between father and mother, rather than father and child... [and] does
not establish parental responsibility toward the child."'  Even though
the remaining two criteria passed constitutional muster, the court struck
down § l1l(l)(e) in its entirety because the invalidated criterion was es-
sential to the legislation. 9
Domestic Relations Law § 11 l(l)(d)-(e) represented the Legislature's
attempt to bring New York law into compliance with Caban v. Moham-
med92 by giving an unwed father who could demonstrate a substantial,
continuous, and meaningful relationship with his child the right to veto
85. See infra notes 168-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of the rights of
unwed fathers in states other than New York.
86. 76 N.Y.2d 387, 559 N.E.2d 418, 559 N.Y.S.2d 855, cerL denied, - U.S. -, 11l
S. Ct. 517 (1990).
87. See 76 N.Y.2d at 407, 559 N.E.2d at 427, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 864.
88. § 111(1)(e) required consent to the adoption as follows:
Of the father, whether adult or infant, of a child born out-of-wedlock who is
under the age of six months at the time he is placed for adoption, but only if-
(i) such father openly lived with the child or the child's mother for a continuous
period of six months immediately preceding the placement of the child for
adoption; and (ii) such father openly held himself out to be the father of such
child during such period; and (iii) such father paid a fair and reasonable sum, in
accordance with his means, for the medical, hospital and nursing expenses in-
curred in connection with the mother's pregnancy or with the birth of the child.
See N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 11 l(l)(e) (McKinney 1988).
89. See 76 N.Y.2d at 405, 559 N.E.2d at 426, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 863.
90. Id.
91. See id. at 405-07, 559 N.E.2d at 426-27, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 863-64.
92. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
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the adoption of his child.93 The Legislature created two different stan-
dards, however, in recognition of an unwed father's inability to demon-
strate an established relationship with his infant surrendered for
adoption at birth or shortly thereafter. Section 11 l(1)(d) governs infants
of putative fathers placed for adoption after six months of age and re-
quires, among other things, continuous visitation and communication
with the child.94 Section 11 1(1)(e) instead relied on an unwed father's
demonstration of parental concern and responsibility as indicators of his
intention to establish a meaningful relationship with his child.95
Raquel Marie was a consolidation of two cases challenging the consti-
tutionality of § 11 l(l)(e).9 6 In the first case, In re Raquel Marie X, Lou-
ise and Miguel met in 1983 while attending high school.9 7 The couple
93. See Scheinkman, Supplementary Practise Commentaries (1990), N.Y. Dom. Rel.
Law § I 1l at C: 111:1 (McKinney Supp. 1992); Memorandum of Sen. Joseph R. Pisani,
1980 NY Legis. Ann. 242-43.
94. § 11 l(1)(d) requires consent to the adoption as follows:
Of the father, whether adult or infant, of a child born out-of-wedlock and
placed with the adoptive parents more than six months after birth, but only if
such father shall have maintained substantial and continuous or repeated con-
tact with the child as manifested by: (i) the payment by the father toward the
support of the child of a fair and reasonable sum, according to the father's
means, and either (ii) the father's visiting the child at least monthly when physi-
cally and financially able to do so and not prevented from doing so by the per-
son or authorized agency having lawful custody of the child, or (iii) the father's
regular communication with the child or with the person or agency having the
care or custody of the child, when physically and financially unable to visit the
child or prevented from doing so by the person or authorized agency having
lawful custody of the child. The subjective intent of the father, whether ex-
pressed or otherwise, unsupported by evidence of acts specified in this para-
graph manifesting such intent, shall not preclude a determination that the
father failed to maintain substantial and continuous or repeated contact with
the child. In making such a determination, the court shall not require a show-
ing of diligent efforts by any person or agency to encourage the father to per-
form the acts specified in this paragraph. A father, whether adult or infant, of a
child born out-of-wedlock, who openly lived with the child for a period of six
months within the one year period immediately preceding the placement of the
child for adoption and who during such period openly held himself out to be the
father of such child shall be deemed to have maintained substantial and contin-
uous contact with the child for the purpose of this subdivision.
See N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 1 Il(l)(d) (McKinney 1988). The Court of Appeals has ex-
pressly declined to rule on the constitutionality of § 11 l(1)(d). See In re Andrew Peter
H.T., 64 N.Y.2d 1090, 1092, 479 N.E.2d 227, 229, 489 N.Y.S.2d 882, 884 (1985).
95. According to the statute's sponsor, Senator Joseph R. Pisani, paying pregnancy
and birth expenses, acknowledging paternity, and living with mother and child were
" 'manifestat[ions] [of] a significant parental interest in the child .. '" and were a "rea-
sonable, unambiguous and objective standard to guide agencies and courts." Memoran-
dum of Sen. Joseph R. Pisani, 1980 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 243 (quoting Caban v. Mohammed,
441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979)).
96. Previous challenges of the constitutionality of § 11 l(l)(e) have failed. See "Fe-
male" D. v. Carol D., 83 A.D.2d 933, 935, 442 N.Y.S.2d 575, 578, appeal dismissed, 55
N.Y.2d 878 (1982); Michael Patrick C. v. Mary C., 83 A.D.2d 932, 932-33, 442 N.Y.S.2d
579, 580-81 (1981)
97. In re Raquel Marie X., 173 A.D.2d 709, -, 570 N.Y.S.2d 604, 605 (1991).
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had a child out of wedlock and made periodic attempts to cohabitate.98
Each effort, however, was short-lived due to their stormy relationship."
On May 26, 1988, Louise gave birth to their second child, Raquel
Marie. 10° Miguel and Louise were still unmarried and living apart when
Raquel Marie was born.' 0 ' Miguel attempted to live with the mother
and daughter following the child's birth but moved out after the first
week because, according to him, "we were arguing, and I thought it
wasn't safe to stay there at night."' 1 2 On July 19, 1988, Miguel filed an
action for custody.'013 Three days later, however, Louise executed a con-
sent to adoption and surrendered Raquel Marie to adoptive parents.1° '
Louise and Miguel subsequently reconciled and married on November 4,
1988.105 Soon after, Louise joined Miguel in his efforts to gain custody of
Raquel Marie."° They maintained that § 111(l)(e) required Miguel's
consent to the adoption and that it had not been obtained."0 7
The lower court held that Miguel had adequately satisfied
§ 11 l(1)(e), and denied the petition for adoption.10 Even though Miguel
and Louise lived separately during the applicable six-month period prior
to placing Raquel Marie for adoption, the court concluded that the
couple had a sufficiently continuous relationship to satisfy a relaxed in-
terpretation of the "living together" requirement."°' The court also
found that Miguel openly acknowledged his paternity and provided fi-
nancial support for the pregnancy and birth." 0
The Appellate Division reversed, however, on the grounds that Miguel
did not satisfy the "living together" requirement even under a loosely
construed interpretation of § 111 (1)(e). "' Miguel appealed from the ap-
pellate court reversal and argued that § 11 (1)(e) unconstitutionally de-
prived him of his right to be a father." 12





102. In re Raquel Marie X., 150 A.D.2d 23, 25, 545 N.Y.S.2d 379, 380 (1989), rev'd,
76 N.Y.2d 387, 559 N.E.2d 418, 559 N.Y.S.2d 855, cer. denied, - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct.
517 (1990).





108. In re Raquel Marie X., 150 A.D.2d 23, 27, 545 N.Y.S.2d 379, 381 (1989) rev'd, 76
N.Y.2d 387, 559 N.E.2d 418, 559 N.Y.S.2d 855, cerL denied, - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 517
(1990).
109. See id. at 25, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 381.
110. See In re Raquel Marie X., 76 N.Y.2d 387, 395, 559 N.E.2d 418, 420, 559





peals was In re Baby Girl S."3 In August of 1987, Regina, the birth
mother, told Gustavo, the putative father, that she had missed her men-
strual cycle. Gustavo responded, "I love you and want to marry you. ''214
Regina, however-worried that pregnancy would threaten her pending
divorce proceedings and custody fight for her nine-year-old son-ended
her relationship with Gustavo and told him that she was not pregnant. 515
Gustavo subsequently learned from a friend that Regina was still carry-
ing their child.1" 6 Regina admitted this but insisted that Gustavo was
not the father. Furthermore, she told Gustavo that she intended to place
the baby for adoption.1 17 Gustavo, convinced that the baby was his,
pleaded with Regina to keep the child and offered her $8,000 to help pay
for pregnancy expenses.118 Regina remained adamant and rejected his
help.' 1
9
Gustavo filed a petition to establish his paternity on March 2, 1988-
53 days before the birth of Baby Girl S. on April 24.120 On May 4, 1988,
the adoptive parents, Jane and Ed, commenced adoption proceedings.' 2'
While Gustavo's paternity petition was pending, Regina appeared before
the family court on May 18, 1988, identified her estranged husband as
the father, and gave her consent to the adoption. 22 Regina gave the
baby to the adoptive parents on June 14, 1988, the same day that Gus-
tavo filed with the Putative Father Registry.' 23 On July 18, 1988, the
court held that Gustavo was the biological father of Baby Girl S. and
scheduled a hearing to determine his parental rights.124
The Surrogate Court ruled that Gustavo had been prevented from
knowing about his paternity and that, therefore, literal compliance with
§ 11 l(1)(e) was impossible.' 25 Because Gustavo did as much as possible
to satisfy the statute, including offering to marry Regina and providing
financial support for the pregnancy, the court read a "savings clause"
into the statute and granted Gustavo a right to veto the adoption. 26 The
Surrogate Court also held that the adoption should fail because Regina
and the adoptive parents engaged in fraud by concealing Gustavo's pater-
nity from him. 27 After the Appellate Division affirmed, the adoptive
parents appealed.
113. 141 Misc. 2d 905, 535 N.Y.S.2d 676 (Sur. Ct. 1988).
114. Id. at 908, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 678.
115. See id.




120. See id. at 907, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 677.
121. See id. at 906, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 677.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 907, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 678.
124. See id. at 907-08, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 678.
125. See id. at 919-20, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 685.
126. See id. at 915, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 682.
127. See id. at 919-20, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 685.
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In declaring § 11 l(l)(e) unconstitutional, the New York Court of Ap-
peals found that the "living together" requirement was only tangentially
related to the father-child relationship and did not further the state's in-
terest in promoting quick, permanent adoption placements to ensure the
well-being of the child.'2 8 Moreover, because the father had to live with
the mother for some portion, if not all, of the six months preceding adop-
tion, the biological mother could attempt to use the "living together"
requirement to unilaterally terminate the father's rights by refusing to
consent to cohabitation.' 29 Additionally, the Court of Appeals found
that the "living together" requirement "permits adoption despite the fa-
ther's prompt objection even when he wishes to form or actually has at-
tempted to form a relationship with the infant that would satisfy the
State as substantial, continuous and meaningful by any other
standard."
30
Pending legislative modification of § 11 1(1)(e), the court formulated
an interim standard for lower courts to use in determining an unwed
father's parental rights.' 3 ' Under this standard, the father must be will-
ing to take custody of the child-not merely try to prevent the adop-
tion.'3 2 He must also promptly manifest his parental responsibility.' 33
In determining an unwed father's manifestation of responsibility, courts
are to contemplate such factors as "public acknowledgment of paternity,
payment of pregnancy and birth expenses, steps taken to establish legal
responsibility for the child, and other factors evincing a commitment to
the child."''
3 4
Applying this standard, the court held in In re Baby Girl S. that Gus-
tavo demonstrated sufficient parental responsibility to earn the right to
veto the adoption because he sought "full custodial responsibility virtu-
ally from the time he learned of Regina's pregnancy, [and] did everything
possible to manifest and establish his parental responsibility."' 35 In Ra-
quel Marie, however, the court determined that it could not decide
whether Miguel appropriately manifested his parental responsibility be-
cause the Appellate Division had based its decision only on Miguel's fail-
ure to satisfy the "living together" requirement and had not gone further
in its analysis. 3 6 The case, therefore, was remanded to the Appellate
Division for further review of the facts to ascertain whether Miguel satis-
fied the new interim judicial standard.' 3 7
128. See In re Raquel Marie X., 76 N.Y.2d 387, 405-06, 559 N.E.2d 418, 426, 559
N.Y.S.2d 855, 863, cert denied, - U.S. -, II S. Ct. 517 (1990).
129. See id. at 405, 559 N.E.2d at 426, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 863.
130. Id.
131. See id. at 407-08, 559 N.E.2d at 427, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 864.
132. See id. at 408, 559 N.E.2d at 428, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 865.
133. See id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 409, 559 N.E.2d at 428, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 865.
136: See id. at 409, 559 N.E.2d at 428-29, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 865-66.
137. See id. at 408, 559 N.E.2d at 429, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 866. On remand, Miguel's
parental rights were terminated because the court held that he failed to satisfy Raquel
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Raquel Marie is significant because it affords an unwed father greater
constitutional protection. No longer are his rights contingent on the
wishes of the mother.13 An unwed father can now demonstrate inde-
pendently that he has assumed parental responsibility, is committed to
his child, and is deserving of full parental rights. 139 Yet Raquel Marie
never addresses the conflict between the putative father's rights and his
infant's best interests caused by granting pendente lite custody to adop-
tive parents. If an unwed father satisfies the Raquel Marie test, courts
must still choose between granting custody to the father and risking emo-
tional harm to his child, or approving the adoption to safeguard the
child's welfare and depriving the father of his parental rights.
II. CONSEQUENCES OF GRANTING PENDENTE LITE CUSTODY TO
ADOPTIVE PARENTS: CONFLICTING INTERESTS OF THE
UNWED FATHER AND His INFANT
A. Problematic Adoption Procedures
If an unwed father is found to be responsible and deserving of parental
rights, it logically follows that the judicial system should award him cus-
tody of his infant. This, however, often does not happen. In many juris-
dictions, the unwed father must overcome an additional obstacle.
States often grant adoptive parents temporary custody of an infant sur-
rendered at birth by the unwed mother until a court decides whether to
finalize the adoption."o This allows the adoptive parents to provide for
Marie's interim standard. See In re Raquel Marie X., 170 A.D.2d 709, 570 N.Y.S.2d 604,
605 (1991). The court found that Miguel did not publicly acknowledge his paternity,
provide adequate birth and pregnancy financial contributions, or promptly establish his
legal responsibility for Raquel Marie. See id. at 605-07.
138. The unwed father's dependency on the mother is illustrated in Baby Girl S., where
Gustavo wished to marry Regina but could not obtain her consent. See In re Baby Girl
S., 141 Misc. 2d 905, 908, 535 N.Y.S.2d 676, 678 (Sur. Ct. 1988).
139. Importantly, Raquel Marie furthers the state's interest in expediting adoptions
and ensuring that the adoption process is dependable because it sets forth unambiguous
and objective criteria that can be evaluated soon after the child's birth. If a putative
father does not immediately manifest significant parental responsibility once his child is
born, Raquel Marie allows the state to deny the unwed father a right of consent and to
permit the adoption to proceed.
140. See, e.g., In re Baby Girl M., 191 Cal. App. 3d 786 (opinion omitted), 236 Cal.
Rptr. 660, 661 (1987), cert. dismissed sub nom. McNamara v. County of San Diego Dep't
of Social Servs., 488 U.S. 152 (1988) (child placed with adoptive parents five weeks after
birth); In re Baby Girl Eason, 257 Ga. 292, 292, 358 S.E.2d 459, 460 (1987) (child placed
with adoption agency three days after birth and soon after given to adoptive parents);
Lathrop v. Scott, 2 Kan. App. 2d 90, 91, 575 P.2d 894, 895 (1978) (child was two days
old when given to adoptive parents); In re Raquel Marie X., 76 N.Y.2d 387, 394, 559
N.E.2d 418, 420, 559 N.Y.S.2d 855, 857, cert. denied, - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 517 (1990)
(Baby Girl S. was given to adoptive parents two days after birth, and Raquel Marie was
placed in an adoptive home two months after birth); John E. v. John Doe, 164 A.D.2d
375, 384, 564 N.Y.S.2d 439, 445 (1990) (Rosenblatt, J., concurring) (child surrendered to
adoptive parents four days after birth); In re Adoption of Kiin, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 29, 1989,
at 27, col. 6 (Sur. Ct. 1989) (child was under three months of age when placed with
adoptive parents).
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the child's physical and psychological needs on a daily basis during cus-
tody proceedings and to develop the kind of relationship with the child
that produces strong emotional attachments. When the custody dispute
is resolved, however, a conflict arises if the court adjudicates the unwed
father to be responsible and deserving of parental rights. As one court
has stated, "the child may be so long in the custody of the nonparent
that, even though there has been no abandonment or persisting neglect
by the parent, the psychological trauma of removal is grave enough to
threaten destruction of the child." '41 In short, should the court deny the
adoption and risk causing emotional harm to the child, or should it grant
the adoption to safeguard the child's best interests and thereby deprive
the putative father of his parental rights? Raquel Marie offers no counsel
on this predicament.
The child's best interests are a primary factor in custody disputes. 14
2
In determining the child's best interests, courts compare the parties seek-
ing custody and favor the party who, in the court's estimation, can pro-
vide the most beneficial living environment for the child.'43 If a
biological parent is involved, however, that biological parent should pre-
vail1" unless there exist "extraordinary circumstances [such as] ... sur-
render, abandonment, persisting neglect, unfitness, and unfortunate or
involuntary disruption of custody over an extended period of time."'45
The child's best interests are most frequently at issue in custody and
visitation disputes between natural parents." Courts also use the child's
141. Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 550, 356 N.E.2d 277, 284, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821,
827 (1976).
142. See Catherine D. v. Dennis B., 220 Cal. App. 3d 922, 926-27, 269 Cal. Rptr. 547,
550 (1990); Guardianship of Claralyn S. v. Gary S., 148 Cal. App. 3d 81, 85, 195 Cal.
Rptr. 646, 649 (1983); Dorminy v. Dorminy, 242 Ga. 326, 326, 249 S.E.2d 49, 49 (1978);
Burnworth v. Hughes, 234 Kan. 69, 74, 670 P.2d 917, 921-22 (1983); In re Marriage of
Yarbrough, 719 S.W.2d 412, 417 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986); C.G.V. v. Texas Dep't of Human
Resources, 663 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex. CL App. 1983).
143. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 250-51 (1977).
144. See Baby Boy D. v. Steven A., 159 Cal. App. 3d 8, 17, 205 Cal. Rptr. 361, 365
(1984); David C. v. Ismael C., 152 Cal. App. 3d 1189, 1208, 200 Cal. Rptr. 115, 127
(1984); In re S.E.H., 180 Ga. App. 849, 850, 350 S.E.2d 833, 834 (1986); Sheppard v.
Sheppard, 230 Kan. 146, 152, 630 P.2d 1121, 1127 (1981), cerL denied, Sumner v. Shep-
pard, 455 U.S. 919 (1982); In re Custody of J. Eden, 216 Kan. 784, 785-86, 533 P.2d
1222, 1223 (1975).
145. Bennett v. Jeffreys at 546, 356 N.E.2d at 281, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 824 (emphasis
added). See also Michael Paul T. v. Thomas R., 124 A.D.2d 970, 971, 508 N.Y.S.2d 822,
823 (1986) ("prolonged separation of parent and child for most of child's life" is an ex-
traordinary circumstance); La Croix v. Deyo, 88 A.D.2d 1077, 1078, 452 N.Y.S.2d 726,
727 (1982) (same), appeal dismissed, 57 N.Y.2d 759, 440 N.E.2d 1336, 454 N.Y.S.2d 989
(1982); Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d 167, 171, 436 N.E.2d 1260, 1262-63, 451
N.Y.S.2d 658, 651 (1982) (same); Dickson v. Lascaris, 53 N.Y.2d 204, 208, 423 N.E.2d
361, 363, 440 N.Y.S.2d 884, 886 (1981) (same).
146. See Mock v. Mock, 258 Ga. 407, 407, 369 S.E.2d 255, 255 (1988); Hart v. Hart,
236 Kan. 856, 856, 695 P.2d 1285, 1285-86 (1985); Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d
167, 169, 436 N.E.2d 1260, 1261, 451 N.Y.S.2d 658, 659 (1982); Friederwitzer v.
Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89, 91, 432 N.E.2d 765, 766, 447 N.Y.S.2d 893, 894 (1982)
Villarreal v. Villarreal, 684 S.W.2d 214, 216 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
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best interests to terminate a parent's rights in cases involving a biological
parent and a non-biological parent. For example, courts have ruled in
favor of placement with a non-biological parent due to a biological par-
ent's neglect. 147 Courts have also awarded custody to a non-biological
parent in order to prevent further physical abuse to a child.14
The child's best interests become an issue in cases involving unwed
fathers because of the prolonged disruption of custody caused by grant-
ing pendente lite custody to the adoptive parents. 149 Courts have held
that this extended separation between father and child may require the
adoptive parents to retain custody of the infant in order to protect the
child's best interests. 150
B. Consequences of Granting Pendente Lite Custody to Adoptive
Parents in New York
Because Raquel Marie never explicitly addressed the effects of award-
147. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Hobson, 8 Kan. App. 2d 772, 777, 667 P.2d 911, 915
(1983) (father had no contact with children for almost three years); In re Michael M., 172
A.D.2d 152, -, 567 N.Y.S.2d 693, 694 (1991) (mother "failed to maintain suitable con-
tact with or plan for the future of the child"); In re Travis Lee G., 169 A.D.2d 769, 770,
565 N.Y.S.2d 136, 137 (1991) (mother sexually abused child); In re Lee Ann "N," 110
A.D.2d 979, 980, 487 N.Y.S.2d 891, 892 (1985) (mother subjected children to sexual
abuse of her paramour and failed to address her alcohol addiction); In re Jennifer VV., 99
A.D.2d 882, 883, 472 N.Y.S.2d 478, 480 (1984) (parents failed to provide for child's
future even though they were financially and physically able to do so); Jordan v. Han-
cock, 508 S.W.2d 878, 880-81 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (natural father abandoned his chil-
dren for a period of two years).
148. See, e.g., In re Elizabeth D., 139 A.D.2d 66, 70, 530 N.Y.S.2d 397, 400 (1988)
(father committed sexual acts with child), appeal dismissed, 73 N.Y.2d 871, 534 N.E.2d
334, 537 N.Y.S.2d 495 (1989); In re Alyne E., 113 Misc. 2d 307, 310, 448 N.Y.S.2d 984,
986 (Fain. Ct. 1982) (father physically assaulted child and withheld psychiatric assistance
from child); In re Shane T., 115 Misc. 2d 161, 164-66, 453 N.Y.S.2d 590, 593-94 (Faro.
Ct. 1982) (father verbally assaulted child by repeatedly questioning his sexuality, without
mother ever interceding on behalf of child, to the point where child became physically
ill).
149. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text. See, e.g., In re Raquel Marie X.,
76 N.Y.2d 387, 394-95, 559 N.E.2d 418, 420, 559 N.Y.S.2d 855, 857, cert. denied, - U.S.
-, 111 S. Ct. 517 (1990) (Raquel Marie spent approximately two years with her adoptive
parents before the court determined her biological father's parental rights); John E. v.
Doe, 164 A.D.2d 375, 384, 564 N.Y.S.2d 439, 445 (1990) (Rosenblatt, J., concurring)
(Daniel spent almost three years with his adoptive parents while the judicial system adju-
dicated his natural father's rights); see also In re Baby Girl M., 191 Cal. App. 3d 786
(opinion omitted), 236 Cal. Rptr. 660, 669 (1987) (court determined biological father's
parental rights over six years after child was placed with adoptive parents), cert. dis-
missed sub nom. McNamara v. County of San Diego Dep't of Social Servs., 488 U.S. 152
(1988); Lathrop v. Scott, 2 Kan. App. 2d 90, 91, 575 P.2d 894, 895 (1978) (court decided
natural father's rights to custody one and a half years after child was placed with adop-
tive parents).
150. See In re Baby Girl M., 191 Cal. App. 3d 786 (opinion omitted), 236 Cal. Rptr. at
669; Michael U. v. Jamie B., 39 Cal. 3d 787, 793, 705 P.2d 362, 366, 218 Cal. Rptr. 39,
42 (1985); John E. v. Doe, 164 A.D.2d 375 at 379, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 442; In re Baby Girl
S., 628 S.W.2d 261, 262 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982), vacated sub nom. Kirkpatrick v. Christian
Homes of Abilene, Inc., 460 U.S. 1074 (1983).
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ingpendente lite custody to adoptive parents, lower courts in New York
have had to determine for themselves how to resolve the resulting con-
flict between the biological father's parental rights and his infant's best
interests.51  The appellate court's splintered decision in John E. v.
Doe152 illustrates the varying opinions which have emerged in New
York. 153
The plurality in John E. held that the putative father did not satisfy
the Raquel Marie standard and, therefore, had no right to prevent the
adoption of his son, Daniel. 54 Yet the court seemed so worried about
the effects of uprooting the child from the adoptive parent's pendente lite
home155 that it incorrectly factored Daniel's best interests into its deter-
mination that the putative father had not established his parental respon-
sibility under Raquel Marie.156  Relying on expert psychological
testimony, the plurality concluded that the putative father should not
receive custody of Daniel because "'a warm, intimate bonding' had
formed between Daniel and his adoptive parents, and that removal from
their care would have 'a devastating psychological effect' on Daniel."' 5 7
The concurrence, taking a somewhat different approach, concluded
that the prolonged separation between father and child amounted to "ex-
traordinary circumstances" ' 8 which also required a finding against a
15 1. Before Raquel Marie declared § 11 l(1)(e) unconstitutional, there was no practical
need for concern over the effects on an infant of a change in custody from the adopting
parents to the biological father because unwed fathers rarely prevailed. See In re Baby
Girl B., 161 A.D.2d 1201, 1201, 558 N.Y.S.2d 875, 875 (1990); In re "Female" D., 83
A.D.2d 933, 935, 442 N.Y.S.2d 575, 578-79 (1981); Michael Patrick C. v. Mary C., 83
A.D.2d 932, 932, 442 N.Y.S.2d 579, 580 (1981); A.F. v. Spence Chapin Agency, 142
Misc. 2d 412, 420, 537 N.Y.S.2d 752, 757 (Fain. Ct. 1989); In re Adoption of Emily Ann,
137 Misc. 2d 726, 731, 522 N.Y.S.2d 786, 789 (Fain. Ct. 1987); In re Adoption of Car-
men Lydia S., 106 Misc. 2d 770, 774,435 N.Y.S.2d 645, 648 (Sur. Ct. 1981). One notable
exception was In re Adoption of Female F. D., 105 Misc. 2d 866, 433 N.Y.S.2d 318 (Sur.
Ct. 1980). Here, the biological father did manage to satisfy § 11 l(l)(e). Rather than
granting custody to the biological father, however, the case was remanded to the lower
court to determine if "the abrupt termination of Susan's relationship with the [adopting
parents] might prove disastrous for Susan's well-being." Id. at 873, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 324.
Female ED. exemplifies the problem that a growing number of unwed fathers could con-
front: granting custody pendente lite to adopting parents may effectively result in termi-
nation of a responsible unwed father's parental rights in order to protect the child's best
interests.
152. 164 A.D.2d 375, 564 N.Y.S.2d 439 (1990).
153. See infra notes 168-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of how other states
have attempted to reconcile the parental rights of unwed fathers with the best interests of
their infants.
154. See John E. v. Doe at 376, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 440.
155. By the time the court rendered its decision, Daniel had lived with his adoptive
parents for almost all of his three years. See id. at 382, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 444.
156. See id. at 379, 382-83, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 442, 444-45. The dissent contended that
the plurality's "two-pronged analysis .... run[s] contrary to the criteria established in
Matter of Raquel Marie X." Id. at 390, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 449 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 383, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 444.
158. Id. at 388, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 448.
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shift in custody in order to protect the child's best interests.' 59 Accord-
ing to the concurrence,
the change in custody portends disaster for Daniel. The psychologist
who testified at the hearing spoke of the "devastating" psychological
effects that await Daniel if his parental bond is to be exploded, while
the psychiatrist described the "serious damage" facing Daniel, includ-
ing the impairment of his cognitive and intellectual functions. 160
Under the concurrence's view, even if the putative father had satisfied the
Raquel Marie requirements, the prolonged separation of father and child
would still necessitate a finding against a custody change. In effect, the
concurrence would only award standing to an unwed father who satis-
fied Raquel Marie and whose child was placed in the care of adoptive
parents pendente lite; the unwed father would then have the burden of
demonstrating that a shift in custody would not impair his child's
welfare. 161
A strongly worded dissent in John E. found the plurality's "two-
pronged analysis" alarming and argued that the court was "bound to
apply the criteria adopted in [Raquel Marie]."1 62  The dissent found that
159. See id.
160. Id. at 387, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 447 (Rosenblatt, J., concurring).
161. Interestingly, the concurrence felt that had the lower court found the putative
father to be responsible, no harm would have come to the infant by a shift in custody at
that stage of the litigation. At that point, "[n]o bond of any duration would have devel-
oped between Daniel and his adoptive parents, certainly not the powerful three-year tie
that has been forged." Id. at 388, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 447-48. Yet, the lower court stated
that Daniel "had very clearly bonded with the proposed adoptive parents and that it
would be a wrenching and emotional experience if the child's custody were transferred to
[the putative father] whom he had never seen and did not know." Erickson v. Doe, 145
Misc. 2d 557, 561, 547 N.Y.S.2d 807, 810 (Fam. Ct. 1989).
A similar approach to the concurrence's approach in John E. was taken in In re Kiran
Chandini S., 166 A.D.2d 599, 560 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1990) where the natural father prevailed
under the Raquel Marie test. The baby in this case was older than two and a half years
when the appellate court rendered its verdict. The court held that the unwed father
"demonstrated sufficient parental responsibility as to establish his right to 'veto' the adop-
tion." Id. at 601, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 888. Instead of granting custody to the putative fa-
ther, however, the appellate division remanded the case to the lower court for "an inquiry
into whether there exist any 'extraordinary circumstances' which would permit an in-
quiry into the question of what custody arrangement would be in the child's best inter-
ests." Id. (citation omitted).
A natural father also passed the Raquel Marie test in In re Baby Girl S., 141 Misc. 2d
905, 535 N.Y.S.2d 676 (Sur. Ct. 1988), aff'd, In re Raquel Marie X., 76 N.Y.2d 387, 559
N.E.2d 418, 559 N.Y.S.2d 855, cert. denied, - U.S. -,lI 11 S. Ct.. 517 (1990). The
court, however, found that the adoptive parents fraudulently withheld knowledge of pa-
ternity from the court; thus, the court never discussed whether remaining with the adop-
tive parents was in the best interests of the child. See id. at 919-20, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 685.
Courts have denied most unwed fathers their parental rights under the Raquel Marie
criteria. See In re Raquel Marie X., 173 A.D.2d 709, -, 570 N.Y.S.2d 604, 605 (1991);
In re Stephen C., 170 A.D.2d 1035, 1035-36, 566 N.Y.S.2d 178, 179 (1991); In re Jessica,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 3, 1991, at 25, col. 5 (Fam. Ct. 1991); In re Anonymous, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 9,
1991, at 28, col. 3 (Sur. Ct. 1991).
162. John E. v. Doe, 164 A.D.2d 375, 390-91, 564 N.Y.S.2d 439, 449 (1990) (Thomp-
son, J., dissenting).
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the putative father had satisfied the standard set forth by the Court of
Appeals and saw no reason why "[this] concerned and fit father [should
be] deprived of custody of his child."' 63
The dissent also disagreed with the concurrence's reasoning and stated
that a separation between father and son caused by the state and the slow
pace of the legal system should not amount to "extraordinary circum-
stances... [and] trigger a best interests analysis."' 64 According to the
dissent,
The fact that the child, who is now three years old, has no estab-
lished relationship with the [putative father], should not be raised as a
ground for denying him custody. This period of separation between
the child and his natural father may not be attributed to any lack of
interest on the [putative father's] part. Rather it is due to the unfortu-
nate pace of these court proceedings to establish his right to custody
even though there is no dispute as to his paternity or as to his ability to
assume his role as a parent.165
One commentator has opined that the Court of Appeals' silence in
163. Id. at 394, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 452.
164. See id. at 394, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 451-52 (citations omitted).
165. Id. at 394, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 451. One year later, a majority of the same court
awarded custody to an unwed father of his infant whom the mother had surrendered
shortly after birth to the Nassau County Department of Social Services. See Alfredo S. v.
Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., 172 A.D.2d 528, -, 568 N.Y.S.2d 123, 127
(1991). Although the father and child had been separated for two years, the court held
that "[tihe period of separation is in large measure attributable to the pace of the instant
proceedings, a circumstance over which the petitioner could exercise virtually no con-
trol." Id. at -, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 125. Importantly, the court never discussed the possi-
ble effects on the child of the required custody transfer from the Department of Social
Services to the father's home. See id. at -, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 128 (Miller, J., dissenting).
This child, however, had been placed in the impersonal confines of a state agency, rather
than the intimate setting of an adoptive parent's home.
Other courts have ruled that a biological parent's primary right to custody should not
be defeated because a nonparent has become a child's emotional provider for an extended
period of time. For instance, in In re Margarita Monegro Yard, a biological mother who
surrendered her daughter to a foster home at birth in order to overcome a drug addiction
was awarded custody of her child seven years later even though the child had lived with a
foster family for the entire time. See N.Y.L.J., Dec. 13, 1991, at 22, col. 6 (Fain. Ct.
1991). According to this court,
while Matter of Bennett v. Jeffreys ... held that a parent's 'abandonment' of a
child may be a circumstance leading to the abrogation of a parent's right to the
return of a child, a similar lack of contact by a parent seeking the child's return,
even though the contact between the parent and child would be the same, has
been held not to be sufficient to overcome a parent's primary right to the return
of the child.
Id. at 24, col. 3; See also In re Adoption of Male Infant L., 61 N.Y.2d 420, 428-29, 462
N.E.2d 1165, 1169-70, 474 N.Y.S.2d 447, 452 (1984) (separation between natural parent
and child not attributable to lack of concern or interest by parent is not sufficient to
deprive parent of custody of his or her child); Dickson v. Lascaris, 53 N.Y.2d 204, 209-
10, 423 N.E.2d 361, 364, 440 N.Y.S.2d 884, 887 (1981) (separation between biological
parent and child due to lawful efforts to regain custody will not defeat parent's custody
claim); Sanjivini K. v. Rockland County Dep't of Social Servs., 47 N.Y.2d 374, 381, 391
N.E.2d 1316, 1320, 418 N.Y.S.2d 339, 343 (1979) (same).
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Raquel Marie on the issue of the child's best interests implies that an
unwed father who passes the Raquel Marie test is entitled to full custody
of his child. 166 Under this view,
[t]he simple explanation for the court omitting discussion of this issue
is that the court treated the child's best interest as irrelevant in assess-
ing the scope of parental rights. Its unspoken premise was that the
state cannot withhold the father's rights improperly for a period of
time and then rely on reference to the child's best interests to terminate
those rights completely. 167
In sum, the multiple opinions expressed in John E. represent the di-
verging views that remain among the New York courts. Each of these
three approaches-the plurality's errant consideration of the child's best
interests in determining the putative father's satisfaction of the Raquel
Marie standard, the concurrence's focus on the "extraordinary circum-
stances" arising due to prolonged separation, and the dissent's strict ap-
plication of the Raquel Marie test-either protects the infant's best
interests or the unwed father's rights. Yet, none of them adequately safe-
guards both. Specifically, if Raquel Marie gives an unwed father stand-
ing only to contest the adoption of his child and an opportunity to argue
that the child's best interests will not be damaged by a shift in custody,
then it clearly falls short of protecting the putative father's rights. By
granting custody pendente lite to adoptive parents, the state is, in effect,
predetermining the child's best interests by stacking the deck against the
putative father from the beginning and substantially reducing its burden
in terminating his rights. If, however, Raquel Marie allows courts to
consider the child's best interests in determining whether the unwed fa-
ther should be granted parental rights, giving temporary custody to
adoptive parents will again unfairly reduce the father's chances of receiv-
ing custody. Finally, and conversely, if Raquel Marie grants full custody
to an unwed father who sufficiently satisfies its criteria, an infant who has
developed an emotional attachment to his adoptive parents may suffer
emotional harm.
C. Consequences of Granting Pendente Lite Custody to Adoptive
Parents in Jurisdictions Outside New York
Other states have had an equally difficult time trying to balance the
rights of a responsible unwed father with the best interests of his infant
who has been nurtured by adoptive parents. In states that emphasize the
child's best interests, 168 courts protect an infant from being psychologi-
166. See Family Law-Unwed Fathers' Rights-New York Court of Appeals Mandates
Veto Power Over Newborn's Adoption For Unwed Father Who Demonstrates Parental Re-
sponsibility-In re Raquel Marie X., 104 Harv. L. Rev. 800, 806 (1991).
167. Id.
168. Examples of child-focused jurisdictions are California, see, e.g., In re Baby Girl
M., 191 Cal. App. 3d 786 (opinion omitted), 236 Cal. Rptr. 660, 666 (1987) (best interests
of child is applicable standard), cert. dismissed sub nom. McNamara v. County of San
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cally traumatized by a custody change. This approach, however, ob-
structs the unwed father's "opportunity interest" in developing a
relationship with his child. Courts in other states safeguard the putative
father's "opportunity interests" in establishing a relationship with his
child169 but provide few precautions for an infant who has emotionally
bonded with his adoptive parents.
Georgia has applied both the "child-focused" and the "parent-fo-
cused" approach. In In re Ashmore,17 0 for instance, a mother surren-
dered her baby for adoption two days after birth. In determining the
unwed father's rights, the Georgia Court of Appeals focused on the
child's welfare and ruled that the child's interests would be best served by
permitting adoption rather than granting custody to the putative fa-
ther.171 The court concluded that "harm would come to this child by
granting [the putative father's] request and thereby disrupting the child's
stable family unit greatly and such exceeds any benefits which might flow
to the child and will greatly outweigh any harm which will come to the
biological Father." '172 Georgia's concern with the child's best interests,
of course, did little to protect the putative father.
Five years later, however, the Georgia courts reversed their position
and held that an unwed father of an infant surrendered for adoption is
entitled to a fitness test, as is the unwed mother, in determining his pa-
rental rights. In In re Baby Girl Eason,' the court rejected the best-
interests test because it was presumptively unfair to compare the putative
father with the adoptive parents who have nurtured and cared for the
child most of its life.174 The court held that:
Only the state can alter its action to prevent the development of a
parent-child relationship with adopting parents until the unwed fa-
ther's rights are resolved. Thus we conclude if [the father] has not
abandoned his opportunity interest, the standard which must be used
to determine his rights to legitimate the child is his fitness as a parent
Diego County Dep't of Social Servs., 488 U.S. 152 (1988), and Texas, see. e.g., In re Baby
Girl S., 628 S.W.2d 261, 262 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982) (same), vacated sub nom. Kirkpatrick
v. Christian Homes of Abilene, Inc., 460 U.S. 1074 (1983). See infra notes 179-88 and
accompanying text.
169. Examples of parent-focused jurisdictions are Georgia, see, e.g., In re Baby Girl
Eason, 257 Ga. 292, 296-97, 358 S.E.2d 459, 463 (1987) (if putative father has not aban-
doned his opportunity interest, standard to determine his right to custody is his fitness as
a parent, rather than child's best interests), Kansas, see, eg., Lathrop v. Scott, 2 Kan.
App. 2d 90, 575 P.2d 894 (1978) (same), and Louisiana, see, e.g., Durr v. Blue, 454 So. 2d
315 (La. CL App. 1984) (in a dispute for custody between a parent and a nonparent, the
parent has the superior right to custody unless proven to be unfit or to have forfeited his
parental rights), cert denied, 461 So. 2d 304 (La. 1984). See infra notes 170-78 and
accompanying text.
170. 163 Ga. App. 194, 293 S.E.2d 457 (1982).
171. Id. at 198, 293 S.E.2d at 461.
172. Id. at 196, 293 S.E.2d at 460.
173. 257 Ga. 292, 358 S.E.2d 459 (1987).
174. See id. at 297, 358 S.E.2d at 463.
1992]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60
to have custody of the child. If he is fit he must prevail. 175
In Kansas, the rights of a responsible unwed father also prevail. In
Lathrop v. Scott,176 for example, an unmarried mother placed her child
with adoptive parents two days after birth. By the time the Kansas
Court of Appeals decided the putative father's custody claim, the child
had lived in the adoptive home for more than a year and a half. 177 Yet
the court held that the unwed father "has parental rights to the custody
of his child and.., those rights must be given preference and will prevail
over those of the adoptive parents due to the parental preference rule."1 7
California has witnessed an ongoing debate on this issue. 179 Recently,
the state legislature and courts have gravitated toward the child-focused
view. The current state statute' 80 distinguishes between a "presumed"
father and a natural father.' California "presumes" that the husband
of the mother at birth is the biological father and affords him rights equal
to those of the mother to veto an adoption of his child.18 2 An unwed
father, on the other hand, receives no veto rights and is granted only an
opportunity to be heard on the best interests of the child before his rights
are terminated. An unwed father may become a "presumed" father and
obtain a veto right only if he "receives the child into his home and openly
holds out the child as his natural child."' 18 3
175. Id.
176. 2 Kan. App. 2d 90, 575 P.2d 894 (1978).
177. See id. at 91, 575 P.2d at 895.
178. Id. at 95, 575 P.2d at 898.
179. See In re Baby Girl M., 9 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2403 (Ct. App. 1983); Detrich v.
Sheldon G., 74 Cal. App. 3d 125, 141 Cal. Rptr. 554 (Ct. App. 1977); In re Reyna, 55
Cal. App. 3d 288, 126 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1976).
180. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 7000-7021 (West 1983 & Supp. 1992). This is California's ver-
sion of the Uniform Parentage Act (hereinafter referred to as the "UPA"). Seventeen
other states have also adopted the UPA: See Alabama (Ala. Code §§ 26-17-1 to 26-17-21
(1986)); Colorado (Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 19-6-101 to 19-6-129 (1986 & Supp. 1991)); Dela-
ware (Del. Code Ann. tithe. 13 §§ 801-819 (Supp. 1990)); Hawaii (Haw. Rev. Stat.§§ 584-1 to 584-26 (1985 & Supp. 1990)); Illinois (Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 40, para. 2501-2526
(Supp. 1991)); Kansas (Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 38-1110 to 38-1129 (1986 & Supp. 1990));
Minnesota (Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 257.51 to 257.74 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992)); Missouri
(Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 210.817 to 210.852 (Vernon Supp. 1992)); Montana (Mont. Code
Ann. §§ 40-6-101 to 40-6-135 (1991)); Nevada (Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 126.011 to
126.391 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1991)); New Jersey (N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 9:17-38 to 9:17-59
(West Supp. 1991)); New Mexico (N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 40-11-I to 40-11-23 (1989)); North
Dakota (N.D. Cent. Code §§ 14-17-01 to 14-17-26 (1991)); Ohio (Ohio Rev. Code Ann.§§ 3111.01 to 3111.19 (Anderson 1989 & Supp. 1990)); Rhode Island (R.I. Gen. Laws§§ 15-8-1 to 15-8-27 (1988)); Washington (Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 26.26.010 to
26.26.905 (1986 & Supp. 1990-1991)); and Wyoming (Wyo. Stat. §§ 14-2-101 to 14-2-120
(1986 & Supp. 1991)). See generally Uniform Parentage Act of 1973, 9B U.L.A. 287
(Master ed. 1987 & Supp. p.2 1991).
181. Cal. Civ. Code § 7004(A)(1)-(4) (West 1983). E.g., Michael U. v. Jamie B., 39
Cal. 3d 787, 790-92, 705 P.2d 362, 364-65, 218 Cal. Rptr. 39, 41-42 (1985).
182. See Cal. Civ. Code § 7004(a)(1) (West 1983 & Supp. 1992).
183. Id. at § 7004(a)(4). Of the eighteen states which have adopted the UPA, eight
have enacted statutes similar to the California Act and grant veto power over an adoption
only to a natural mother. See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 584-24 (1985); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-
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Gaining custody of the child and obtaining "presumed" father status,
however, is no easy task for the unwed father in California. He must
show that placing the child in his care would promote the child's best
interests. In cases where the child has already been placed with adoptive
parents, the unwed father has an extremely difficult burden to meet.'"
For example, in In re Baby Girl M., an unwed mother relinquished cus-
tody of her child soon after birth to adoptive parents whose identities
were unknown to the father.18 5 The putative father learned of the exist-
ence of his child and filed for custody. Even though the court considered
the unwed father to be a fit parent, the court denied his petition because
it determined that the child's best interests would be best served by re-
maining in the only home she ever knew.' 8 6
Similarly, Texas places the child's best interests ahead of the putative
father's parental rights. In In re Baby Girl S., a putative father sought
custody of his infant girl surrendered to adoptive parents at birth. ' 7 The
Texas appellate court denied the unwed father's petition for custody be-
cause, unlike the adoptive parents, the unwed father had no "family rela-
tionship" with the child.'88
In brief, a survey of other states shows that, as in New York, granting
adoptive parents custody of an infant before the judicial system deter-
mines the unwed father's parental rights inevitably creates a situation
where someone loses.'" 9 If the putative father is subsequently found to
1129 (1986 & Supp. 1990); Min. Stat. Ann. § 257.74 (West 1982); Mont. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 40-6-128 to 40-6-130 (1991); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 128.150 (Michie 1986); N.D. Cent.
Code § 14-17-24 (1991); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3107.06 (Anderson 1989); Wash. Rev.
Code Ann. §§ 26.26.190, 26.33.120 (1986).
In Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), the United States Supreme Court
recently upheld the constitutionality of California's statutory scheme. See id; supra notes
67-82 and accompanying text.
In New York, a putative father can rebut the presumption of legitimacy of a child born
during the term of a marriage based on HLA blood test results. See Michaella M.M. v.
Abdel Monem El G., 98 A.D.2d 464, 470 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1984); See also Piacenti v.
Piacenti, N.Y.LJ., July 27, 1990, at 22, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1990) (court has the authority to
require an HLA blood test to rebut the presumption of legitimacy of a child born into an
existing marriage where such legitimacy is questioned).
184. Note, Certainly Not Child's Play: A Serious Game of Hide and Seek With the
Rights of Unwed Fathers, 40 Syracuse L. Rev. 1055, 1081 (1989).
185. 191 Cal. App. 3d 786 (opinion deleted), 236 Cal. Rptr. 660 (1987), cert. dismised
sub norm. McNamara v. County of San Diego Dep't of Social Servs., 488 U.S. 152 (1988).
186. See also Michael U. v. Jamie B., 39 Cal. 3d 787, 793, 705 P.2d 362, 366, 218 Cal.
Rptr. 39, 42 (1985) (awarding custody to unwed father after child had bonded with adop-
tive parents would be detrimental to child); In re Baby Boy Reyna, 55 Cal. App. 3d 288,
302, 126 Cal. Rptr. 138, 147 (1976) (if granting custody to a natural parent instead of to
the adoptive parents is harmful to the child, custody must be awarded to the adoptive
parents).
187. 628 S.W.2d. 261 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982), vacated sub nom. Kirkpatrick v. Christian
Homes of Abilene, Inc., 460 U.S. 1074 (1983).
188. Id. at 262. See also In re Unnamed Baby McLean, 697 S.W.2d 479, 481 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1985) (court denies unwed father's custody request because it was not in the child's
best interests).
189. Arizona statutorily provides for placement of the child with the adoptive parents
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be responsible, courts must either place the child's emotional well-being
in jeopardy or deprive the putative father of his parental rights.
III. PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS
Given the diverging approaches of state courts and legislatures, a prac-
tical solution is needed to resolve the inherent tension between an unwed
father's rights and the best interests of his infant held pendente lite by
adoptive parents.
In crafting a solution, it is important to recognize that before the state
intervenes, the unwed father's parental rights are not incompatible with
his infant's best interests. If a responsible unwed father receives custody
directly after the mother surrenders the infant for adoption, this father is
fully capable of providing a stable, nurturing home in which to care for
and cultivate his child's emotional development. The responsible father's
rights and his infant's best interests conflict only after the state grants
pendente lite custody to an adoptive couple and allows the child to grow
psychologically attached to his "temporary" parents. The state can
avoid creating this unnecessary conflict between father and child, and
thereby give meaning to the parental rights of an unwed father without
jeopardizing the child's best interests, by instituting a two-pronged prac-
tical solution: (1) grant pendente lite custody to the unwed father; and
(2) expedite the adjudication of the unwed father's rights.
A. Award the Unwed Father Pendente Lite Custody of His Infant
Surrendered for Adoption
States effectively predetermine the child's best interests by granting
pendente lite custody to adoptive parents. Every day the infant remains
with his adoptive parents, the more difficult it becomes to convince a
court that it is in the child's best interests to disturb his caring arrange-
ments and transfer him to a responsible putative father's home.' 90 As a
result, the adoptive parents' chances of receiving permanent custody of
the infant increase, while the putative father's chances diminish. 9, In-
stead of granting custody to adoptive parents pending the outcome of an
adoption proceeding, courts should award the biological fatherpendente
lite custody of his infant. This would benefit the biological father, the
infant, and the judicial decision-making process.
pending the determination of the natural father's rights. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-
108 (1989).
190. See Bainham, When is a Parent Not a Parent? Reflections on the Unmarried Fa-
ther and His Child in English Law, 3 Int'l J. of L. & the Fam. 208, 233 (1989); see, e.g., In
re Baby Girl M., 191 Cal. App. 3d 786 (opinion deleted), 236 Cal. Rptr. 660, 662-66 (Ct.
App. 1987) (best interest of five year old child who was placed with adoptive parents
when she was five weeks old was to remain with adoptive parents even though court
found natural father to be fit and responsible), cert. dismissed sub nom. McNamara v.
County of San Diego Dep't of Social Servs., 488 U.S. 152 (1988).
191. See Bainham, supra note 190, at 233.
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If the unwed father demonstrates that he is responsible and capable of
fulfilling his parental role, he has a constitutional right to raise his child.
Such a putative father should not be deprived of this right simply because
the state has delayed adjudicating his rights and allowed adoptive parents
to care for his infant in the interim. Between adoptive parents and a
biological father, only the biological father has a constitutional claim to
the child at the time of delivery. The genetic bond between father and
child gives them a shared heritage and a common ancestry, and it
presents the biological father with a unique opportunity to develop a
meaningful relationship with his own offspring. In contrast, adoptive
parents have neither physiological nor emotional bonds with the child:
they develop connections with the child only after the state intercedes
and grants them temporary custody pending the outcome of their adop-
tion petition.
A natural father's biological connection coupled with his active desire
to raise his child should establish his primary right to custody. New
York courts have held that "it has long been the rule... that 'the mother
has the right to the custody of an illegitimate child as against the father,
though the father has the right to the custody as against a stranger.' "192
Indeed, as the New York Court of Appeals has stated, "[t]he mother or
father has a right to the care and custody of a child, superior to that of all
others, unless he or she has abandoned that right or is proved unfit to
assume the duties and privileges of parenthood.""19 Even the United
States Supreme Court has held that parents have a fundamental right to
raise their children-a right which is beyond the reach of any court.1 94
Granting a willing unwed father pendente lite custody of his infant sur-
rendered for adoption will give meaning to these holdings.
Awarding pendente lite custody to an unwed father would also benefit
his child. It is a "generally accepted view that a child's best interest is
that it be raised by its parent unless that parent is disqualified by gross
misconduct."' 95 In Lehr, the Supreme Court considered the biological
link between father and child as an opportunity possessed by no other
male to "make uniquely valuable contributions to the child's
192. In re Adoption of Baby Girl, 103 Misc. 2d 542, 546, 426 N.Y.S.2d 398, 401 (Faro.
Ct. 1980) (citations omitted); see also Lathrop v. Scott, 2 Kan. App. 2d 90, 92, 575 P.2d
894,896 (1978) (in custody contest between parent and nonparent, preference should be
given to parent); Durr v. Blue, 454 So. 2d 315, 321 (citing Wood v. Beard, 290 So. 2d 675
(La. 1974) and Long v. Harris, 420 So. 2d 1299 (La. Ct. App. 1982), cert denied, 461 So.
2d 304 (La. 1984) (same).
193. People ex. rel. Kropp v. Shepsky, 305 N.Y. 465, 468, 113 N.E.2d 801, 803 (1953).
See also In re Mitchell, 70 A.D.2d 367, 370, 421 N.Y.S.2d 443, 445 (1979) ("the natural
father of an illegitimate child possesses this right no less than the father of a child born in
wedlock").
194. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
195. Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv. v. Polk, 29 N.Y.2d 196, 203, 274 N.E.2d 431, 436,
324 N.Y.S.2d 937, 944 (1971); see also Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG., 70 N.Y.2d 141, 144,
511 N.E.2d 75, 77, 517 N.Y.S.2d 932, 933 (1987) ("parental custody of a child may not




Furthermore, the child would benefit from developing a relationship
with his biological father by learning about his genetic heritage. There is
a strong psychological need for people to discover their biological identi-
ties and ancestries; this knowledge is essential for a full understanding of
who we are. 197 According to one scholar, "the child's development 're-
lies on the meeting both of his needs as an individual and his need to find
a place and an identity through the richness of his extended family.' "19
By depriving a child of a relationship with his biological parent, and thus
denying him knowledge of his heritage, the child's psychological devel-
opment could be adversely affected. 199 The state should acknowledge
that it is in a child's best interests to allow every responsible parent, in-
cluding an unwed father, to exercise a parental role and participate in the
development and maturation of his or her child.2"
Granting a biological father pendente lite custody would also simplify
judicial decision-making by providing judges with direct evidence of a
putative father's parental competence. While factors such as payment of
medical expenses and acknowledgment of paternity are helpful criteria in
determining the parental responsibility of a putative father, they are at
best only imprecise indicators of his ability to care for his child. The
legal system could make more informed decisions of the parental respon-
sibility of a putative father if it examined an existing relationship between
father and child. Court-appointed psychologists could examine the
child's mental state and the formation of an emotional bond between fa-
ther and child during pendente lite custody. Similarly, judges could in-
quire into the living arrangements provided by the father. Only through
such pragmatic measures can states improve the accuracy and fairness of
court decisions involving an unwed father's custody rights.
B. Accelerate Adjudication of the Unwed Father's Parental Rights
While granting custody pendente lite to a biological father would bene-
fit the father, the child could be harmed if the father is subsequently
adjudicated to be irresponsible. Presumably, such a putative father
would have been providing deficient child care during court proceedings,
and the required custody shift to the adoptive parents could traumatize
the child. Moreover, awarding pendente lite custody to a putative father
196. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262.
197. This could explain why many adopted people continually pressure the courts to
unseal their adoption records in order to find their natural parents. See Adoptees Want
Access to Roots-Secrecy Hinders Woman's Search, Seattle Times, May 2, 1991, at Dl;
Massive Nationwide Court-Petition Drive, Rallies to Mark National 'Open My Records'
Day, PR Newswire, April 29, 1991; Adoption-Reform Advocates Gather for New Eng-
land Conference, PR Newswire, Nov. 14, 1990.
198. Bainham, supra note 190, at 227 (quoting Arnon Bentovim (Bentovim, 1980)).
199. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
200. See, e.g., Dickson v. Lascaris, 53 N.Y.2d 204, 208, 423 N.E.2d 361, 363, 440
N.Y.S.2d 884, 886 (1981) (child's best interest is to be raised by its natural parent).
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might have the reverse effect of predetermining the child's best interests
in favor of the putative father. The state could decrease the potential
harm to the emotional welfare of the infant, however, by accelerating the
adjudication of the unwed father's rights. A swift judicial process would
benefit both the putative father and his infant without burdening the
legal system.201
Courts can take as long as five years to determine an unwed father's
parental rights.2"2 This slow pace allows the infant to grow psychologi-
cally attached to his pendente lite nurturer. The state could affirmatively
demonstrate its commitment to the infant's emotional well-being by giv-
ing these cases priority and expediting the decision-making process.
Speedy adjudication would decrease the child's emotional attachment to
his pendente lite parents and reduce the trauma of a custody change. The
best protection the judicial system could provide for the infant's emo-
tional state is swift placement in a permanent setting.
State legislatures should require courts to resolve the unwed father's
parental rights as quickly as possible, perhaps within six months of the
child's birth.2 "3 Courts, in their discretion, could institute discharge
plans whereby successful adoptive parents would not immediately receive
custody; this would further diminish the possibility of emotional harm to
the infant. Courts could initially grant adoptive parents unsupervised
visitations, and as the infant became more accustomed to them, over-
night visitations would be permitted.2' Full custody would be granted
only after the child had become completely acclimated to his new sur-
roundings and family.2"5
Giving priority to cases determining the parental rights of unwed fa-
thers would be judicially manageable.' 6 In the past year and a half in
New York, for example, only a handful of such cases have been re-
201. See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
203. According to Judge Bernard E. Stanger, Family Court, Rockland County, New
York, as long as the putative father is promptly notified of his parenthood, expediting the
judicial process so that the father's parental rights are determined within six months of
the child's birth is judicially manageable and would not overburden the court system.
Telephone interview with Judge Bernard E. Stanger, Family Court, Rockland County,
New York (Feb. 25, 1992). For a discussion of the unwed father's right to be notified of
the birth of his child, see generally Note, The Unwed Father and the Right to Know of His
Child's Existence, 76 Ky. L.J. 949, 1009 (1987-88) ("The unilateral decision by [the
mother] to deprive [the putative father] of the opportunity to know his child-without
any showing of fault on the part of the [putative father] ... would not, it is submitted, be
accepted-or tolerated-in any other context.").
204. To preserve the confidentiality of the adoption record, see supra note 5 and ac-
companying text, courts could appoint a social worker to act as an intermediary between
the natural father and the adoptive parents. The social worker would be advised not to
disclose to the unwed father any information regarding the adoptive parents.
205. See In re Margarita Monegro Yard, N.Y.LJ., Dec. 13, 1991, at 22, col. 6 (Sur.
Ct. 1991).
206. See supra note 203.
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ported.2 °7 Moreover, if states consider the threat of emotional harm to
infants to be of such serious concern, accelerating custody proceedings
outweighs any minimal administrative burden the states might
experience.
Critics may contend that giving an unwed father custody of his infant
pendente lite could harm the adoption process by discouraging potential
adoptive parents. Adoptive parents might get disheartened by the pros-
pect of waiting for the natural father's rights to be adjudicated before
they could initiate adoption proceedings. If courts later determined the
unwed father to be an irresponsible parent, the infant might be left with-
out an adoptive home.
Although encouraging adoption is important, it should not undercut
the unwed father's constitutional rights. Instead, providing custody to a
putative father pendente lite will give the state a strong incentive to alter
its management of these cases. Decreasing the time it takes the judicial
system to adjudicate these cases will benefit everyone involved, even the
state: the child will benefit by being expeditiously placed in a permanent,
stable environment; the adoptive parents and the unwed father will be
spared the trauma and legal costs of protracted custody disputes; and the
state will benefit by furthering its own interest in providing efficient and
dependable adoption proceedings.
CONCLUSION
After years of discrimination, the Supreme Court finally granted pa-
rental rights to the unwed father through a series of decisions. From
Stanley2' s to Lehr,2"9 the Court has established that a biological connec-
tion plus an existing relationship with his child entitles an unwed father
to constitutional protection of his right to a continuing parental relation-
ship. Raquel Marie demonstrates a mounting effort to follow the spirit of
these decisions by protecting the rights of an unwed father who has not
207. See In re Raquel Marie X., 173 A.D.2d 709, -, 570 N.Y.S.2d 604, 605 (1991); In
re Stephen C., 170 A.D.2d 1035, 1036, 566 N.Y.S.2d 178, 179 (1991); In re Kiran
Chandini S., 166 A.D.2d 599, 601, 560 N.Y.S.2d 886, 888 (1990); In re Jessica, N.Y.L.J.,
Sept. 3, 1991, at 25, col. 5 (Far. Ct. 1991); In re Anonymous, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 9, 1991, at
28, col. 3 (Sur. Ct. 1991). Moreover, only a small number of putative fathers have report-
edly had their rights adjudicated under N.Y. Dom Rel. Law II1 (1)(e) (McKinney 1988
& Supp. 1992) until Raquel Marie declared it unconstitutional, a period of ten years. See
In re Baby Girl B., 161 A.D.2d 1201, 1201, 558 N.Y.S.2d 875, 875 (1990); In re "Fe-
male" D., 83 A.D.2d 933, 935, 442 N.Y.S.2d 575, 578-79 (1981); Michael Patrick C. v.
Mary C., 83 A.D.2d 932, 932, 442 N.Y.S.2d 579, 580 (1981); A.F. v. Spence Chapin
Agency, 142 Misc. 2d 412, 420, 537 N.Y.S.2d 752, 757 (Fam. Ct. 1989); In re Adoption
of Emily Ann, 137 Misc. 2d 726, 731, 522 N.Y.S.2d 786, 789 (Fam. Ct. 1987); In re
Adoption of Carmen Lydia S., 106 Misc. 2d 770, 774, 435 N.Y.S.2d 645, 648 (Sur. Ct.
1981); In re Adoption of Female F. D., 105 Misc. 2d 866, 869-870, 433 N.Y.S.2d 318, 322
(Sur. Ct. 1980).
208. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
209. 463 U.S. 248 (1983); see supra notes notes 22-66 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Supreme Court's expansion and clarification of the unwed father's pa-
rental rights.
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had an opportunity to develop a relationship with his newborn infant.
Yet, instead of safeguarding the parental rights of this putative father,
Raquel Marie illustrates the inability of courts to resolve the state-cre-
ated dilemma caused by granting pendente lite custody of his infant to
adoptive parents. Not only must courts consider whether the unwed fa-
ther will be a responsible parent; they must further consider whether a
custody transfer would harm the infant's emotional well-being.
Awarding a biological father pendente lite custody of his infant who
has been surrendered for adoption and expediting the adjudication of his
parental rights would benefit the father, his infant, and the adoption pro-
cess. Until state legislatures grant an unwed father custody of his infant
while his parental rights are being determined, the judicial system will
provide little more than lip service to protecting his constitutional rights.

